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REFUSING TO CONCEDE THE 
ELECTION: DEFENDING DEMOCRACY 
BY EXPANDING THE G7 RAPID 
RESPONSE MECHANISM 
Taylor Hayes* 
The past decade is rife with examples of actions by nefarious groups to improperly interfere in 
democratic elections around the world, and it is time that democratic nations band together to 
effectively combat these interference efforts. More than two dozen nations around the world have 
fallen victim to some form of election interference. The United States and its allies have traced 
many of these interference campaigns to state actors, particularly the Russian government. 
In 2018, the Group of Seven (G7) announced the creation of a Rapid Response Mechanism 
(G7 RRM). The aim of the G7 RRM is to limit the impact of election interference through 
collecting and sharing information about interference campaigns. Most G7 nations have 
generally complied with the requirements for the G7 RRM, but, by limiting the institution to 
only G7 nations, the G7 RRM will not have a broad enough membership base to have the 
necessary impact to protect elections. 
The United States should take a prominent role in the development and expansion of election 
security expertise by leading the creation of an Election Security Centre of Excellence 
(ESCOE) accredited by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The knowledge 
gained from the ESCOE should then be operationalized and incorporated into U.S. election 
laws. NATO is well positioned to host an “expanded-G7 RRM,” or ESCOE. NATO has 
more than four-times as many member nations as the G7, has a history of countering Russian 
influence, has developed expertise relevant to election security, and its “center for excellence” 
(COE) organization model would be effective to create an ESCOE. With the knowledge 
gained from an ESCOE, democracies around the world can better defend their elections. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A vital part of a healthy democracy is a healthy election 
system. Democracies rely on elections to provide fair and accurate 
results that reflect the choices made by citizens. Since elections are an 
essential part of a functioning democracy, they are also an attractive 
target for those wishing to disrupt or undermine either a single 
democracy or the concept of democracy as a whole. 
The twenty-first century is rife with examples of nefarious 
groups attempting to meddle in democratic elections. If the last 
decade has taught democracies around the world anything, it should 
be that no nation should be caught off guard when its next election is 
the target of an interference campaign. The prominence of election 
interference around the world has prompted the creation of a variety 
of institutions with similar, overlapping aims to combat 
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disinformation generally,1 but this global problem needs a unified 
institution that will gather together democracies around the globe to 
develop the knowledge and techniques to effectively protect an 
election from improper foreign interference. To this end, the United 
States should take a prominent role in the development of election 
security expertise by leading the creation of an Election Security 
Centre of Excellence (ESCOE) accredited by the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO), and the knowledge gained from the 
ESCOE should be incorporated into U.S. election laws. 
The discussion that follows begins with Part II, which 
provides a description of the concept of election interference and 
examples of such interference. Part III explains the efforts of the 
Group of Seven (G7) to combat election interference with the 
creation of the G7 Rapid Response Mechanism (G7 RRM). The G7 
RRM was an important step toward securing elections in the United 
States and abroad, but it was only a small step. As a result, Part IV 
discusses NATO’s ability to adopt the blueprints of the G7 RRM and 
create an ESCOE. Next, Part V describes the power of the U.S. 
federal government to take a leadership role in the creation of an 
ESCOE and subsequently implement lessons learned into U.S. 
federal election laws. Finally, Part VI argues that the United States 
should do just that, take a leadership role in the creation of an 
ESCOE and have its expertise inform federal election laws. 
II. ELECTION INTERFERENCE 
The ever-growing list of democracies impacted by election 
interference demonstrates the need for additional knowledge and 
systems to protect democracies. Notably, the list includes the United 
States and its infamous 2016 Presidential Election. Also included is 
the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Netherlands, Montenegro, 
 
 1 See generally SOPHIA IGNATIDOU, EU-US COOPERATION ON TACKLING 
DISINFORMATION 18, 31–32 (2019), https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default
/files/2019-10-03-EU-US-TacklingDisinformation.pdf (listing the Transatlantic 
Commission on Election Integrity, the European Centre of Excellence for 
Countering Hybrid Threats, and the European Rapid Alert System as a few of the 
existing institutions combatting disinformation). 
2020 Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 9:1 
106 
and many more.2 At least one report suggests that Russia alone has 
interfered in twenty-seven nations’ elections since 2004.3 The global 
scope of election interference has created a problem that should 
involve a global solution.4 
Election interference can take many forms, and it is a term 
that encompasses more than merely helping one candidate win an 
election over another candidate. The interference could aim to 
damage “trust in the election,” to create internal disruption, to 
damage a nation’s external appearance, or simply to damage the 
image of all democracies as a whole.5 To create interference that 
accomplishes one of these goals, the interferers could (1) attack the 
election administration, (2) attack “the will and ability of voters to 
 
 2 Russian Intervention in European Elections: Hearing before the Select Comm. on 
Intelligence of the United States Senate, 115th Cong. 2–14 (2017) [hereinafter Russian 
Intervention in European Elections]; see also Emma Woollacott, Russian Hackers Target 
European Elections, FORBES (Mar. 21, 2019, 9:41 AM), https://www.forbes.com/
sites/emmawoollacott/2019/03/21/russian-hackers-target-european-elections/
#61ff6fe33c7c; Dan Sabbagh & Luke Harding, PM Accused of Cover-Up Over Report 
on Russian Meddling in UK Politics, GUARDIAN (Nov. 4, 2019, 4:38 PM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2019/nov/04/no-10-blocks-russia-eu-
referendum-report-until-after-election. 
 3 Oren Dorell, Allege Russian political meddling documented in 27 countries since 
2004, USA TODAY (Sept. 7, 2017, 6:20 PM), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2017/09/07/alleged-russian-
political-meddling-documented-27-countries-since-2004/619056001/; see also James 
Pamment, The EU’s Role in Fighting Disinformation: Taking Back the Initiative, 
CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT’L PEACE (July 15, 2020), 
https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/07/15/eu-s-role-in-fighting-disinformation-
taking-back-initiative-pub-82286 (describing Russia as “the dominant hostile actor 
currently spreading disinformation,” while also noting that China may be “Russia’s 
superior in terms of its potential capabilities”). 
 4 Russian Intervention in European Elections, supra note 2, at 1 (statement of 
Sen. Burr, Chairman, S. Select Comm. On Intelligence) (“Facing down Russia’s 
malicious activity is no longer just a bipartisan issue. To successfully protect our 
institutions and the integrity of our electoral systems, we must work as a global 
community to share our experience.”). 
 5 SEBASTIAN BAY & GUNA ŠNORE, PROTECTING ELECTIONS: A 
STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS APPROACH, NATO STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION 
CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE 10 (2019), https://www.stratcomcoe.org/download/
file/fid/80396. 
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participate,” or (3) attack the political debate.6 Evidence of efforts to 
accomplish each of these three goals can be seen in the Russian 
interference in the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election. 
A. Election Administration 
There is evidence of an attack by Russia on U.S. election 
administration systems and infrastructure. A report of the U.S. 
Senate’s Select Committee on Intelligence found that the “Russian 
government directed extensive activity, beginning in at least 2014 and 
carrying into at least 2017, against U.S. election infrastructure.”7 The 
report further elaborated that it’s reference to election infrastructure 
included attacks against voter registration databases, election-related 
websites, election software, and election service companies.8 These 
efforts targeted systems in all fifty states.9 Furthermore, the efforts 
included extensive, targeted attacks on specific components in the 
overall election system, such as a manufacturer of “devices that 
maintain and verify the voter rolls.”10 
B. Will and Ability 
An attack on the will and ability of voters focuses on 
impacting voters’ mental states. One way to do this is to attempt to 
create fear. An April 2018 paper by a group of scholars explained one 
method used by Russia to instill fear in American voters in 2016.11 
 
 6 Id. at 10–11, fig 1. 
 7 S. SELECT COMM. INTELLIGENCE, 116TH CONG., REPORT ON RUSSIAN 
ACTIVE MEASURES CAMPAIGNS AND INTERFERENCE IN THE 2016 U.S. ELECTION 
3 (Comm. Print 2019). 
 8 Id. at 6, 8. 
 9 David E. Sanger & Catie Edmondson, Russia Targeted Election Systems in 
All 50 States, Report Finds, N.Y. TIMES (July 25, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/25/us/politics/russian-hacking-elections.
html. 
 10 Matthew Cole et al., Top-Secret NSA Report Details Russian Hacking Effort 
Days Before 2016 Election, THE INTERCEPT (June 5, 2017), https://theintercept.com
/2017/06/05/top-secret-nsa-report-details-russian-hacking-effort-days-before-
2016-election/. 
 11 Dr. Emily Darraj et al., Information Operations: The Use of Information 
Weapons in the 2016 US Presidential Election (Apr. 2018) (conference paper from the 
European Conference on Cyber Warfare and Security at the University of Dublin), 
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The scholars stated that in September and October of 2016 several 
major news organizations featured articles stating that if Hilary 
Clinton won the presidency, then Russia would go to war with the 
United States.12 These articles were connected by the authors to a 
Russian goal to “paralyze” voters with misinformation, checking the 
box of an attack on “the will and ability of voters to participate.”13 
Another way to attack the will and ability of voters is to use 
one election as an example to destroy confidence in future elections. 
As the United States headed into its 2020 election cycle, a January 
2020 poll found that 41% of Americans think that the United States 
is not prepared to ensure that November 2020 elections will be safe 
and secure.14 Though one can’t claim that all of the American 
skepticism captured in that poll was caused by prior attempts to 
interfere in American elections, it seems equally dubious to assert that 
prior interference hasn’t impacted the numbers reported. 
C. Political Debate 
An attack to influence the political debate is one that aims to 
shape the political discussions in the nation. One example of how the 
Russian campaign sought to influence the political debate was by 
releasing previously private emails to influence political headlines. 
The report of Special Counsel Robert Mueller on Russian 




 12 Id. The story that Russia would go to war if Hillary Clinton won the 
election was carried by several major news organizations including New York Daily 
News and Reuters. Id. 
 13 Id. (noting Russian efforts to spread information “designed to paralyze” 
voters). 
 14 Brett Neely, NPR Poll: Majority of Americans Believe Trump Encourages 
Election Interference, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Jan. 21, 2020, 5:01 AM), 
https://www.npr.org/2020/01/21/797101409/npr-poll-majority-of-americans-
believe-trump-encourages-election-interference. This same poll also found that 
35% of Americans viewed misinformation has the biggest threat to our elections, 
beating out the next two most popular responses which were voter fraud and voter 
suppression. Id. 
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sought to attack the political debate during the 2016 election cycle.15 
It states how, in March 2016, Russia began gaining access to the 
computers and email accounts of individuals associated with Hilary 
Clinton’s presidential campaign and the Democratic National 
Committee.16 The hacking continued throughout 2016, resulting in 
the release of thousands of documents stolen from the various 
compromised computers and accounts.17 The documents released 
undoubtedly impacted the political discussion in the United States as 
the leaked documents made national and international headlines.18 
An interferer can also influence the political debate by 
encouraging the polarization of the electorate. In the wake of the 
2016 Presidential election, two political science professors conducted 
a study to analyze how foreign election interference impacted 
American voters.19 After giving study participants a hypothetical 
about a future presidential election, the professors found that foreign 
involvement in the election had a polarizing effect on American 
voters. The study suggested that “[b]oth Democrats and Republicans 
were far more likely to condemn foreign involvement, lose faith in 
democracy, and call for retaliation when a foreign power sided with 
the opposition than when a foreign power aided their own party.”20 
Notably, the study found that “even modest forms of electoral 
intervention divided and demoralized the country.”21 
 
 15 ROBERT S. MUELLER, III, U.S. DEP’’T OF JUST., REPORT ON THE 
INVESTIGATION INTO RUSSIAN INTERFERENCE IN THE 2016 PRESIDENTIAL 
ELECTION 36 (2019), https://www.justice.gov/storage/report.pdf. 
 16 Id. 
 17 Id. at 40–43. 
 18 See generally Amy Chozick et al., Highlights from the Clinton Campaign Emails: 
How to Deal with Sanders and Biden, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 10, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/10/us/politics/hillary-clinton-emails-
wikileaks.html; David Smith, WikiLeaks Emails: What they revealed About the Clinton 
Campaign’s Mechanics, GUARDIAN (Nov. 6, 2016, 6:30 AM), https://
www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/nov/06/wikileaks-emails-hillary-clinton-
campaign-john-podesta. 
 19 Michael Tomz & Jessica L. P. Weeks, Public Opinion and Foreign Electoral 
Intervention, 114(3) AM. POL. SCI. R. 856 (2019), https://
tomz.people.stanford.edu/sites/g/files/sbiybj4711/f/tomzweeks-apsr-2020.pdf. 
 20 Id. at 857. 
 21 Id. 
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With firsthand knowledge of the disruptive intentions and 
capabilities of the foreign meddlers, namely Russia, the United States 
needs to take an active role in creating a global solution to prevent or 
reduce the impact of future interference efforts. 
III. G7 RRM 
At least a portion of the global solution necessary to combat 
the rise in election interference has begun to take shape with the 
recent creation of the G7 RRM. The G7 RRM is a coordination tool 
created to increase the flow of election-related information to better 
protect elections in the G7 nations.22 The G7 RRM is an important 
first step in the journey to enhanced election security. 
A. Creation of the G7 RRM 
The G7 RRM was announced following the completion of 
the G7 summit in Challevoix, Quebec, Canada, through the 
Charlevoix G7 Summit Communique on June 9, 2018 (the 
Communique).23 Paragraph 15 of the Communique stated that the 
G7 was committed to taking “concerted action in responding to 
foreign actors who seek to undermine our democratic societies and 
institutions, our electoral processes, our sovereignty and our security 
as outlined in the Charlevoix Commitment on Defending Democracy 
from Foreign Threats.”24 
The document referenced in Paragraph 15, the Commitment 
on Defending Democracy from Foreign Threats (Commitment on 
Defending Democracy), laid out seven additional commitments 
which underpinned the G7 RRM. These included commitments to: 
3. Establish a G7 Rapid Response Mechanism to 
strengthen our coordination to identify and respond 
 
 22 Jan Strupczewski, G7 to Pledge Joint Defense of Democracies from Foreign 
Threats: EU Official, REUTERS (June 5, 2018, 3:09 PM), https://
www.reuters.com/article/us-g7-summit-foreign-threats-idUSKCN1J12NN. 
 23 G7, Charlevoix G7 Summit Communique, (June 9, 2018), http://www.
g7.utoronto.ca/summit/2018charlevoix/communique.html. 
 24 Id. ¶ 15. 
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to diverse and evolving threats to our democracies, 
including through sharing information and analysis, 
and identifying opportunities for coordinated 
response. 
4. Share lessons learned and best practices in 
collaboration with governments, civil society and the 
private sector that are developing related initiatives 
including those that promote free, independent and 
pluralistic media; fact-based information; and freedom 
of expression. 
5. Engage directly with internet service providers and 
social media platforms regarding malicious misuse of 
information technology by foreign actors, with a 
particular focus on improving transparency regarding 
the use and seeking to prevent the illegal use of 
personal data and breaches of privacy. 
6. Support public learning and civic awareness aimed 
at promoting critical thinking skills and media literacy 
on intentionally misleading information, and 
improving online security and safety.25 
The G7 RRM announcement in Paragraph 15, along with the related 
Commitment on Defending Democracy, is a step toward more 
secure elections. However, the necessary buy-in from the United 
States and other G7 nations has not always been guaranteed. 
B. Complying with the Commitment 
Though the United States is a member of the G7 and has 
previously participated in the G7 tradition of signing on to the 
communiques at the end of each summit, 2018 was a different 
 
 25 G7, Charlevoix Commitment on Defending Democracy From Foreign 
Threats (June 9, 2018), http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/summit/2018charlevoix/
democracy-commitment.html. 
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story.26 U.S. President Donald Trump was present at the G7 meeting 
in La Malbaie, Quebec, Canada, along with leaders from Canada, the 
United Kingdom, France, Italy, Japan, and Germany. However, 
President Trump broke from tradition when he stated following the 
summit that the United States would not endorse the joint 
communique.27 Though one could be forgiven for being confused 
about the United States’ role in the G7 RRM after President Trump’s 
refusal to endorse the Communique, his refusal did not result in the 
United States refusing to comply with the political commitments in 
the Commitment on Defending Democracy.28  
By mid-2019, the United States was one of at least three G7 
governments to have a group of civil servants sharing information in 
the name of the G7 RRM.29 The two other nations were Canada and 
the United Kingdom.30 Canada has created a G7 RRM Coordination 
Unit (RRM Canada) that “serves as a permanent secretariat to the 
[G7] RRM.”31 RRM Canada is to report on “threat patterns and 
 
 26 See G8 Background, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov
/archives/ag/g8-background (last updated Mar. 8, 2017). Though this source 
references the “G8,” the G8 became the G7 when Russia was removed from the 
Group after its invasion of Ukraine in 2014. See Andrew Restuccia & Brent D. 
Griffiths, Trump Stuns Allies, Won’t Sign G-7 Joint Agreement, POLITICO (June 9, 2018, 
2:37 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/06/09/trump-g7-allies-clashes-
trade-tariffs-russia-635006. 
 27 G7 Summit Ends in Disarray as Trump Abandons Joint Statement, BBC NEWS 
(June 10, 2018), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-44427660 
(explaining that “Trump said he had instructed US officials ‘not to endorse the 
communique’”). 
 28 It should be noted at this point that the Communique and the 
Commitment on Defending Democracy are non-binding political commitments, as 
are most G7 commitments. See CAMILLA BAUSCH & MICHAEL 
MEHLING, Alternative Venues of Climate Cooperation: An Institutional Perspective, in 
CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE LAW 111, 122 (2012) (“The G8 summits aim primarily 
to send political signals and set trends, and do not produce binding results.”). 
 29 Josh Rudolph, The G7 Should Redouble Efforts to Stop Covert Foreign Money, 
CIPHER BRIEF (Aug. 23, 2019), https://www.thecipherbrief.com/column_article
/the-g7-should-redouble-efforts-to-stop-covert-foreign-money (“Since then, three 
G7 governments have launched teams of civil servants sharing threat intelligence 
with each other, but thus far they’ve only focused on information operations.”). 
 30 Id. 
 31 Rapid Response Mechanism Canada, GOV’T OF CANADA (Sept. 6, 2019), 
https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/issues_development-
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trends” and share the information that it learns with other G7 
partners.32 The United Kingdom’s Rapid Response Unit (UK RRU) 
has been set up within their Government Communications Service to 
focus on “news and information being shared and engaged with 
online to identify emerging issues.”33 Though it’s not exactly clear 
how all other G7 nations are fulfilling their political commitment, it 
does appear most nations are taking steps to comply. 
On February 25, 2019, the G7 Research Group at the 
University of Toronto issued the 2018 Charlevoix G7 Interim 
Compliance Report.34 This report explained that, for G7 nations to 
be in “full compliance” with the Commitment on Defending 
Democracy, the nations must take actions directed towards fulfilling 
five of the seven above referenced commitments.35 The actions taken 
could be through verbal responses, diplomatic actions, or physical 
actions.36 The compliance report evaluated all seven nations’ progress 
and found Canada, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States to be in full compliance with the Commitment on 
 
enjeux_developpement/human_rights-droits_homme/rrm-mrr.aspx?lang=eng; G7 
Rapid Response Mechanism, GOV’T OF CANADA (Jan. 30, 2019), https://www.
canada.ca/en/democratic-institutions/news/2019/01/g7-rapid-response-
mechanism.html. One can even find what appears to be a job posting for the RRM 
Canada. See Senior Policy Analyst, G7 Rapid Response Mechanism Coordination 
Unit, Global Aff. Canada, http://www.ieim.uqam.ca/IMG/pdf/ib_lbp-_11485298
-v1-job_poster_-_senior_policy_analyst_-_g7_rapid_response_mechanism.pdf (last 
visited Apr. 27, 2020). 
 32 G7 Rapid Response Mechanism, supra note 31; Rapid Response Mechanism 
Canada, supra note 31. 
 33 Alex Aiken Introduces the Rapid Response Unit, GOV’T COMMC’N SERV. (July 
19, 2018), https://gcs.civilservice.gov.uk/news/alex-aiken-introduces-the-rapid-
response-unit/. Though the UK RRM appears to be a UK component of the G7 
RRM, it should be noted that the UK RRM was created before the G7 RRM 
commitment was announced. 
 34 ANGELA MIN YI HOU ET AL., 2018 CHARLEVOIX G7 INTERIM 
COMPLIANCE REPORT: 10 JUNE 2018–10 DECEMBER 2018, U. OF TORONTO (Feb. 
25, 2019), http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/evaluations/2018compliance-interim/01-
2018-G7-interim-compliance-terrorism.pdf. 
 35 Id. at 17 (“Thus, for full compliance, the members must have taken 
actions in 5 or more of those listed in the Charlevoix Commitment on Defending 
Democracy from Foreign Threats.”). See also supra section III.A. 
 36 Id. at 18. 
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Defending Democracy. This left Japan as the only nation found in 
partial compliance, and Italy as the only nation found to be non-
compliant.37 
Though the University of Toronto report suggests that most 
G7 nations are acting to comply with the Commitment to Defend 
Democracy, very little is known about how the G7 RRM functions 
and what its lasting impact will be. 
C. RRM Actions 
As of the spring of 2020, little information is available that 
sheds light on the actual workings of the G7 RRM or its impact, but 
the absence of a clear track-record for success does not undercut the 
need for an organization that will facilitate international cooperation 
to protect democracies from outside interference. The most concrete 
information about the G7 RRM comes from the work done by RRM 
Canada and the UK RRU. 
RRM Canada has released three reports discussing election 
interference.38 Two of these reports – one on the 2019 European 
Union Parliamentary Elections and one on the 2019 provincial 
elections in Alberta, Canada – found no notable evidence of foreign 
interference.39 However, the third report, discussing the 2019 
Ukrainian Presidential Election, found that the Ukrainian election 
“was likely the target of a Russian [foreign interference] campaign 
 
 37 Id. at 18–38. 
 38 Rapid Response Mechanism Canada, supra note 31. 
 39 Rapid Response Mechanism Canada, Open Data Analysis- European 
Parliamentary Elections: Comprehensive Report, GOV’T OF CANADA (July 18, 2019), 
https://www.international.gc.ca/gac-amc/publications/rrm-mrr/european-
elections-europeennes.aspx?lang=eng; Rapid Response Mechanism Canada, Open Data 
Analysis- Alberta Election Analysis, GOV’T OF CANADA (May 1, 2019), 
https://www.international.gc.ca/gac-amc/publications/rrm-
mrr/alberta_elections.aspx?lang=eng. See also Marianne Lavelle, ‘Trollbots’ Swarm 
Twitter with Attacks on Climate Science Ahead of UN Summit, INSIDE CLIMATE NEWS 
(Sept. 16, 2019), https://insideclimatenews.org/news/16092019/trollbot-twitter-
climate-change-attacks-disinformation-campaign-mann-mckenna-greta-targeted 
(discussing RRM Canada’s detection of “questionable social media activity” around 
Alberta elections.) 
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aimed at undermining local and international confidence in the 
Ukrainian democracy.”40 The report states that RRM Canada detected 
some common interference techniques, such as automated social 
media accounts or “bots,” and some unusual interference techniques, 
such as Russian intelligence agents renting established social media 
accounts and the use of “meta-trolling.”41 
The only other information regarding the actions of the G7 
RRM comes from the UK RRU. In January 2019, the UK RRU 
published a discussion of their actions for the year of 2018.42 The 
discussion highlighted the UK RRU’s focus on news stories and 
misinformation found online.43 Though these actions weren’t tied to 
a specific election, the UK RRU did appear to focus heavily on 
polarizing issues that will have an impact on future elections, such as 
Brexit.44 
There is a clear need for the G7 RRM or a similar 
international mechanism to counter the impact of election 
interference, but there is little information available about the G7 
RRM outside of the information discussed above regarding RRM 
Canada and the UK RRU. Most other mentions of the G7 RRM note 
its existence but offer little information other than describing the G7 
RRM as having the potential to fill the growing need for an 
organization to combat election interference.45 While the G7 RRM 
 
 40 Rapid Response Mechanism Canada, 2019 Ukrainian Elections Final Report, 
GOV’T OF CANADA (Sept. 3, 2019), https://www.international.gc.ca/gac-
amc/publications/rrm-mrr/ukrainian-elections-ukrainiennes.aspx?lang=eng. 
 41 Id. Meta-trolling was described in the report as “content designed to be 
detected and called out as Russian propaganda in order to discredit the 
information” contained in the post. Id. 
 42 Oliver Marsh, Rapid Response Unit: A Year in Digital Trends, GOV’T 




 43 Id. 
 44 Id. 
 45 See generally Christopher Walker, Safeguarding Democracies Against 
Authoritarian Sharp Power, POLICY OPTIONS (Jan. 14, 2019), https://
policyoptions.irpp.org/magazines/january-2019/safeguarding-democracies-against-
authoritarian-sharp-power/ (stating that “the nascent Rapid Response Mechanism 
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begins to fill that need, to better protect democracies around the 
world, a mechanism similar to the G7 RRM needs to be expanded.46  
IV. NATO POTENTIAL 
One international organization well positioned to launch an 
“expanded RRM” is NATO, and it could be launched as an ESCOE. 
NATO is an organization with broader membership than the G747 
and is well positioned to lead this expansion because of (1) its history 
as a coalition to counter Russian influence; (2) its work to develop 
expertise relevant to protecting elections from interference, including 
centers focused on cooperative cyber defense and strategic 
communications; and (3) the suitability of NATO’s mission specific 
“centres for excellence” (COEs) as a model for the new election 
security organization. By capitalizing on NATO’s position, the 
United States could greatly increase its ability to protect its own 
elections while simultaneously increasing the election defense 
capabilities of other NATO democracies. 
 
(RRM) initiated in 2018 under Canada’s G7 presidency to defend against foreign 
threats holds promise and could offer a valuable model of cooperation for future 
efforts to defend democracy and the ideas that underlie it”); Press Release, Prime 
Minister’s Office, Hostile States to Face Rapid and Unified International Response 
(June 9, 2018), https://www.gov.uk/government/news/hostile-states-to-face-
rapid-and-unified-international-response; Undermining Democracy: Kremlin Tools of 
Malign Political Influence: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Europe, Eurasia, Energy, and the 
Environment of the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 116th Cong. 28 (2019) [hereinafter 
Undermining Democracy] (statement of Laura Rosenberger, Director of the Alliance 
for Securing Democracy and Senior Fellow with the German Marshall Fund) 
(arguing that the response to Russian interference should include information and 
coordination organizations like the G7 RRM). 
 46 See Undermining Democracy, supra note 45 (highlighting that “[t]ransatlantic 
cooperation, including unified responses across the EU and within NATO, is 
essential” to combat Russian interference). 
 47 Member Countries, NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION, 
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_52044.htm? (last visited May 3, 
2020) (noting that NATO currently has 30 member nations). 
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A. Counter Russian Influence 
As noted above, one of the primary election interferers has 
been Russia;48 and, coincidentally, NATO was born of the need to 
counter Russian actions. After the end of World War II, nations on 
both sides of the Atlantic sought collective security against the 
growing threat from the Soviet Union. In 1949, NATO was created 
as an extension of the 1948 Brussels Treaty among Western 
European nations, and it allowed nations to band together against the 
Soviet Union.49 Though the European nations initially sought to limit 
membership in the newly created NATO to the signatories of the 
Brussels Treaty and the United States, eventually the view won out 
that the alliance would benefit from enlarging the group to “bridge” 
the North Atlantic Ocean.50 This bridging coalition countered the 
ever-present threat of the Soviet Union throughout the close of the 
twentieth century, and it persists as a powerful force into the twenty-
first century. 
B. Relevant Expertise 
As NATO has worked to adjust to a post-cold war 
international environment, it has begun to develop various COEs, 
and an ESCOE could build upon the expertise in existing COEs. 
COEs are mission-specific institutions created to develop knowledge 
and capabilities by furthering developments in their specific area.51 
NATO has already developed twenty-five COEs for issues ranging 
from specialized military operations, such as “Operations in 
 
 48 See supra Part II. 
 49 Milestones: 1945-1952: North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 1949, 
DEP’ OF STATE: OFF. OF THE HISTORIAN, https://history.state.gov
/milestones/1945-1952/nato (last visited Apr. 27, 2020). The members of the 
Brussels treaty were Great Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and 
Luxembourg. Id. 
 50 Id. 
 51 See Centres of Excellence, NATO ALLIED COMMAND TRANSFORMATION 
(2019), https://www.act.nato.int/centres-of-excellence (last visited Apr. 26, 2020). 
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Confined and Shallow Waters,” to more generalized issues, such as 
“Crisis Management and Disaster Relief.”52 
Two existing COEs, the “Cooperative Cyber Defence” COE 
(CCDCOE) and the “Strategic Communications” COE (SCCOE) 
appear to have already laid the foundation for a potential ESCOE.53 
The CCDCOE began operations in 2008 and exists to create 
cooperation and information sharing channels for “exercises, law and 
policy workshops, technical courses and conferences to prepare 
NATO and Sponsoring Nations to detect and fight cyber-attacks.”54 
Since January 2018, the CCDCOE has been tasked with educating 
and training all NATO components on cyber defense.55 
The SCCOE leverages NATO’s communications apparatus 
to support NATO policies, operations, and activities. This includes 
using “traditional media, internet-based media and public 
engagement, to build awareness, understanding, and support for its 
decisions and operations.”56 To fulfill this aim, the SCCOE develops 
communications education courses and conducts research on 
 
 52 Centres of Excellence, NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION, 
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_68372.htm (last updated Jan. 24, 
2019). COEs are not officially part of the NATO Command Structure and are 
nationally or multi-nationally funded. Id. However, even though they exist outside 
the formal structure of NATO, they offer an interesting example of how NATO 
nations can pool their resources and expertise. 
 53 Though not a NATO accredited COE, another source of relevant 
expertise is the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats, an 
institution which currently shares information with both the European Union and 
NATO. See IGNATIDOU, supra note 1, at 31. 
 54 Id. 
 55 About Us: History, NATO COOPERATIVE CYBER DEFENCE CENTRE OF 
EXCELLENCE, https://ccdcoe.org/about-us/ (last visited Apr. 27, 2020). 
 56 About Strategic Communication, NATO STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS 
CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE, https://www.stratcomcoe.org/about-strategic-
communications (last visited Apr. 27, 2020). 
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communications related issues, such as “Robotrolling”57 and 
disinformation campaigns.58 
By drawing from the cyber defense expertise of the 
CCDCOE as well as the strategic communications knowledge of the 
SCCOE, NATO has the knowledge base to form an ESCOE that 
can competently compile and distribute information to help protect 
elections in member nations. An ESCOE could undoubtedly draw on 
the CCDCOE’s cyber expertise to better understand how to protect 
election systems and monitor infiltration attempts. Further, by 
combining this cyber knowledge with the strategic communications 
and messaging knowledge of the SCCOE, an ESCOE could better 
understand the messaging strategies used by interfering nations on 
social media platforms. Using the seven commitments laid out in the 
Commitment on Defending Democracy as the guiding outline,59 a 
hybrid combination of the CCDOE and the SCCOE should be more 
than adequate to work toward election security. 
C. Suitability of the COE Model 
In addition to NATO as a whole being well positioned, the 
NATO COE model appears to be well suited for the creation of an 
ESCOE because COEs are designed to tackle specific subsets of 
issues and can be driven by a small group of NATO nations. 
Furthermore, the formal establishment and accreditation process for 
a new COE does not appear to impose any insurmountable obstacles 
for an ESCOE. 
A new COE must go through a formal NATO establishment 
process that requires at least one nation to assume a leadership role. 
The first step of the establishment process is a request for a new 
 
 57 Dr. Rolf Fredheim et al., Robotrolling, NATO STRATEGIC 
COMMUNICATIONS CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE (2020), https://www.stratcomcoe
.org/robotrolling-20201. 
 58 Rachael Lim, Disinformation as a Global Problem- Regional Perspectives, 
NATO STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE (2020), 
https://www.stratcomcoe.org/disinformation-global-problem-regional-
perspectives. 
 59 See supra Section III.A. 
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COE from either NATO itself or a NATO member nation.60 Once a 
request for a new COE is formulated, a particular member nation, 
known as a “framework nation,” is responsible for moving it through 
the establishment process.61 As the COE moves through the early 
stages of the establishment process, it is important for the COE to 
pick up sponsoring nations that will support the creation and 
development of the COE. The establishment process is completed 
when two memorandums of understanding (MOUs) are signed by 
the nations that have agreed to create the COE.62 
In addition to the above described steps in the COE 
establishment process, the proposed COE must be accredited by 
satisfying the NATO “mandatory criteria” and the less stringent 
“highly desirable criteria.” The mandatory requirements are that the 
new COE: 
1. Further “new policies, concepts, strategies and 
doctrines that transform and/or improve NATO 
operational capabilities and interoperability.” 
2. “Provide capabilities, not provided by other NATO 
entities. . . .[and] promote the knowledge and 
application of advanced concepts and doctrines. . . .” 
3. “[M]aintain qualified knowledgeable and credible 
Subject Matter Experts (SME) for their niche area of 
expertise.” 
 
 60 COE CATALOGUE, ALLIED COMMAND TRANSFORMATION 5 (Dec. 
2018), 
https://www.act.nato.int/images/stories/structure/coe_catalogue_20190118.pdf. 
 61 Centres of Excellence, supra note 51. In addition to the framework nation, 
there can be sponsoring nations, which contribute funds and personnel to the 
centre, and contributing nations, which generally contribute funds or something 
else of value. Id. 
 62 COE CATALOGUE, supra note 60; Guy B. Roberts, NATO’s Centers of 
Excellence: A Key Enabler in Transforming NATO to Address 21st Century Security 
Challenges (Oct. 8, 2014) (working paper) (“Allied nations, which agree to establish 
and operate a particular COE, must sign two Memoranda of Understanding 
(MOU); an ‘Operation MOU’ and a ‘Functional Relationship MOU,’ in order to 
become Sponsoring Nations.”). 
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4. Educate and train in a manner “consistent with the 
quality, content and standardization of established 
NATO educational policy and services.” 
5. Provide safety and security “in accordance with 
NATO standards and regulations.” 
6. Provide accessibility to NATO nations and 
agencies. 
7. Maintain “open lines of communication with [the 
Supreme Allied Commander Transformation], 
Strategic Commands, their subordinate entities and 
agencies and other nations.”63 
The highly desirable criteria that the COE must strive for are 
not a basis for decertification,64 and generally include promoting the 
goals of the NATO Allied Command Transformation, encouraging 
support and participation from NATO nations, promoting 
transparency and efficient coordination of the COE, and maintaining 
modern communication and information systems.65 
The proposed ESCOE should not have any significant 
problems meeting the demands of the NATO establishment and 
accreditation requirements. First, the United States and other G7 
nations are all capable of making the initial request to NATO for the 
creation of a new ESCOE. The framework nation should have the 
support of the other NATO members that have signed on to the G7 
RRM, thus there should be little worry that the new COE would 
pick-up a sufficient number of sponsoring or contributing nations. 
Second, using the current blueprint of the G7 RRM as a 
stand-in for the shape an ESCOE would take, the NATO 
accreditation process should not be a significant hurdle. There does 
not appear to be any other NATO component or COE dedicated to 
protecting elections and thus an ESCOE would further new policies 
 
 63 Roberts, supra note 62. 
 64 Id. 
 65 Id. 
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while not duplicating existing capabilities. Though there would likely 
be overlap between an ESCOE, on one hand, and CCDOE and the 
SCCOE, on the other hand, an ESCOE would require capabilities 
that the CCDOE and the SCCOE appear to lack. These necessary 
capabilities would include in-depth knowledge of the election laws 
and election technology networks in all participating nations. The 
individuals who provide these necessary capabilities would certainly 
also qualify as SMEs “for their niche area of expertise.” 
The remaining required criteria can also be satisfied by an 
ESCOE. There is nothing that would impede the COE from 
educating in a manner consistent with NATO standards. Further, 
there does not appear to be an impediment to an ESCOE providing 
safety and security of elections in compliance with NATO standards. 
Accessibility to NATO nations similarly should not be a problem 
because the COE would appear to benefit from gathering 
information from many different elections and sharing its knowledge 
to all member nations to decrease the impact of potential election 
interference campaigns. Lastly, there should not be any reason that an 
ESCOE would have an issue maintaining open communication with 
the various components of the NATO command structure. 
V. MAKING IT HAPPEN: CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS 
With the need for the United States to take action quite 
apparent, the individuals with the power to act need to take action. 
First, the President needs to move forward with the creation of an 
ESCOE. It is not entirely clear whether the MOUs to establish an 
ESCOE would be binding or non-binding international agreements.66 
However, regardless of the binding or non-binding nature of the 
agreements, the President appears to have the authority to approve 
the MOUs.67 The second step is for the lessons learned from the 
ESCOE to be woven into U.S. election law. The states and the 
federal government share the power to regulate and control elections 
in the United States.68 However, the federal government has broad 
 
 66 See infra section V.A. 
 67 See infra section V.B. 
 68 See infra section V.C. 
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powers emanating from Article I, sections 2 and 4, of the 
Constitution, and those powers appear sufficient to enact the changes 
needed to further secure American elections.69 
A. Binding vs. Non-Binding 
Until the MOUs for an ESCOE are actually drafted, one 
would not know if they are intended to be binding or non-binding 
international agreements. There is clear evidence that the MOUs to 
establish various NATO COEs are intended to be non-binding 
agreements as several MOUs expressly state that the agreement is not 
“intend[ed] to create any rights or obligations under international 
law.”70 However, the one NATO COE on U.S. soil, the Combined 
Joint Operations from the Sea Centre of Excellence, may have been 
established with at least one binding MOU as there is no clear 
statement in the MOU to avoid the creation of international 
obligations71 and the MOU appears in the Department of State’s List 
 
 69 Id. Though it doesn’t expressly deal with elections, the necessary and 
proper clause further supports these two election specific sections of the 
Constitution. United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 315 (1941); Graham August 
Toney Floyd, Federalism, Elections, Preemption, and Supremacy: The Aftermath of Inter 
Tribal Council, 33 MISS. C. L. REV. 235, 256 (2014) (citing Classic, 313 U.S. at 315); see 
also United States v. Bowman, 636 F.2d 1003 (5th Cir. 1981). 
 70 Memorandum of Understanding Concerning the Establishment, 
Administration and operation of the NATO Mountain Warfare Centre of 
Excellence sec. 14.4, Mar. 25, 2016, https://www.mwcoe.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/05/1457353348.pdf. Similar statements are found in the 
following. See also Memorandum of Understanding Concerning the Functional 
Relationship Regarding the NATO Mountain Warfare Centre of Excellence sec 8.2, 
Mar. 25, 2015, https://www.mwcoe.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/05/1457448557.pdf; Note of Joining by the Minister of 
Defence of the Kingdom of Belgium and Amendment of the Memorandum of 
Understanding on the Establishment, Administration and Operation of the Centre 
of Excellence for Military Medicine sec. 14.7, July 28–Dec., 2014, 
https://www.coemed.org/files/static_texts/MILMED%20COE%20OPS%20MO
U_BEL%20joining_4Dec2014.pdf; Memorandum of Understanding Concerning 
the Establishment, Administration and Operation of the NATO Strategic 
Communications Centre of Excellence sec. 14.5, July 1, 2014, https://
m.likumi.lv/doc.php?id=267690. 
 71 Memorandum of Understanding Concerning the Establishment, 
Administration, and Operation of the Combined Joint Operations from the Sea 
Centre of Excellence sec. 4, May 31, 2006, T.I.A.S. No. 06-531.1. 
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of Treaties in Force.72 Adding to the confusion is guidance from 
NATO suggesting that MOUs are generally non-binding,73 while a 
working paper from a former Department of Defense official 
suggests COE MOUs have a binding character.74 Despite this 
confusion, the President appears to have the legal authority to 
approve either a binding or non-binding MOU to establish an 
ESCOE. 
B. The President 
The constitutional powers of the President most relevant to 
the ability to serve as a framework nation for the creation of an 
ESCOE are the powers to negotiate, approve, and ratify the required 
MOUs. Once an ESCOE is created, the President must then be able 
to implement or carry out the obligations of the MOUs. Every action 
of the President must be an outgrowth of power granted to the 
presidency by the Constitution or an act of Congress.75 Here, the 
President’s inherent powers to conduct foreign affairs and 
delegations by Congress appear to place the President on solid legal 
grounds. If the ESCOE MOUs turn out to be non-binding, the 
President’s power to negotiate is all that is needed. However, if the 
ESCOE MOUs turn out to be binding, then the President will also 
need to have the power to approve the agreement. 
 
 72 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, MULTILATERAL TREATIES IN FORCE ON 
JANUARY 1,2020 506 (2020), https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/
2019/07/2019-TIF-Multilaterals-7-31-2019-1.pdf. 
 73 Andres B. Munoz Mosquera, Memorandum of Understanding (MOU): A 
Philosophical and Empirical Approach (Part I), 34 NATO LEGAL GAZETTE55, 57 
(2014), 
https://www.act.nato.int/images/stories/media/doclibrary/legal_gazette_34a.pdf; 
N. ATL. TREATY ORG., NATO LEGAL DESKBOOK, 127–29 (2d ed. 2010), 
https://publicintelligence.net/nato-legal-deskbook/ (noting that MOUs are 
generally non-binding, though the United States doesn’t always consider MOUs to 
be non-binding). 
 74 Roberts, supra note 62 (referring to the MOUs as “legally binding 
documents”). 
 75 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585 (1952). 
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1. Power to Negotiate 
The power of the President, or the executive branch in 
general, to negotiate an international agreement is well settled. As a 
result, this power should not be an issue for a President seeking to 
serve as a framework nation for a new ESCOE. A non-binding 
international agreement can be made on the President’s power to 
negotiate alone, so there is no question that the President can 
authorize a non-binding MOU.76 With regard to binding international 
agreements, the President’s power to negotiate has been affirmed in 
conclusory fashion in cases such as United States v. Curtiss-Wright 
Export Corporation77 and the more recent Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. 
Kerry.78 
The conclusion of the Supreme Court in these two high-
profile decisions was that the “President has the sole power to 
negotiate treaties,” and that power appears applicable here.79 For an 
ESCOE to be supported by the United States and ultimately 
accredited by NATO, there must be two MOUs, and these MOUs 
must first be negotiated before any party can sign on. These 
negotiations would likely be conducted by officials from the 
Department of Defense and the State Department. There appears to 
be little problem with the President, acting through other executive 
branch officials, negotiating these MOUs with other supporting 
nations to begin the establishment process of an ESCOE. 
 
 76 See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Presidential Control over 
International Law, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1201, 1218 (2018) (“In practice Presidents 
have asserted the authority to make a political commitment on practically any topic 
without authorization from Congress or the Senate and without any obligation to 
even inform Congress about the commitment, as long as the commitment does not 
violate extant federal law.”). 
 77 United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936) (“In 
this vast external realm, with its important, complicated, delicate and manifold 
problems, the President alone has the power to speak or listen as a representative 
of the nation. He makes treaties with the advice and consent of the Senate; but he 
alone negotiates.”) 
 78 Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 576 U.S. 1 (2015) (citing Curtiss-Wright, 
299 U.S. at 319) 
(“The President has the sole power to negotiate treaties.”). 
 79 Id. 
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2. Power to Approve 
The slightly more controversial step that the President would 
need to take to initially establish an ESCOE is to conclude a binding 
MOU. The framework to analyze the President’s power to conclude a 
legally binding international agreement is an outgrowth of Justice 
Jackson’s concurring opinion in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. 
Sawyer.80 In Youngstown, Justice Jackson described three distinct 
categories of presidential actions: actions taken “pursuant to an 
express or implied authorization of Congress,” actions taken in the 
“absence of either a congressional grant or denial of authority,” and 
actions taken contrary to the “expressed or implied will of 
Congress.”81 When acting with the authorization of Congress, the 
Presidency has its greatest power, and the Presidency has its least 
power when acting in the face of Congressional disapproval.82 This 
rigid tripart framework was transformed by Justice Rehnquist into a 
“spectrum” of Presidential powers in Dames & Moore v. Regan.83 This 
spectrum blended each of the three categories into a graduated scale 
of Presidential power with each extreme on the scale still marked by 
actions with the support of Congress and actions in the face of 
Congress.84 
Applying Justice Rehnquist’s spectrum of Presidential power 
to the ability of the President to create an ESCOE, it appears the 
President would be acting with the express approval of Congress and 
thus likely has the power to conclude the necessary MOUs. The most 
relevant act of Congress that research has identified is 10 U.S.C. § 
344.85 In § 344, Congress authorized the Secretary of Defense, “with 
 
 80 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
 81 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. at 635–38 (1952) (Jackson, J., 
concurring). 
 82 Id. Actions in the middle category of congressional silence place the 
President in a zone of power between the two extremes. 
 83 Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 669 (1981) (discussing Youngstown 
Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring)). 
 84 Id. at 668–69. 
 85 10 U.S.C.A. § 344 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-140). Another 
tangentially relevant statute that supports the President’s power related to an 
ESCOE is 10 U.S.C. § 311. In § 311, Congress authorized the Secretary of Defense 
to enter “international defense personnel exchange agreements” with other nations. 
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the concurrence of the secretary of State,” to have American 
personnel participate in a “multinational military center of 
excellence.”86 A multinational military center of excellence is defined 
in § 344 as “an entity sponsored by one or more nations that is 
accredited and approved by the Military Committee of [NATO].” 
Further, § 344 requires that the American participation in the center 
of excellence be pursuant to “the terms of one or more memoranda 
of understanding entered into by the Secretary of Defense, with the 
concurrence of the Secretary of State.”87 This section appears to be 
an express authorization from Congress for the President to enter 
into the MOUs necessary to create an ESCOE and places the 
President near the top of the Rehnquist spectrum.88 An action with 
the express authorization of Congress “would be supported by the 
strongest of presumptions” that the President has the requisite 
power.89 
3. Power to Ratify 
The final step for a binding agreement is for the President to 
formally ratify the agreement. The final act of ratification through 
which a nation “expresses its ‘intent to be bound,’” is an event 
 
Such agreements would involve American personnel being sent to another nation 
or a security organization and the U.S. government paying the costs of sending its 
personnel abroad. Further context for the powers afforded the Secretary of 
Defense through § 311 is that it is found in the “Military-to-Military Engagements” 
subchapter of title 10. 
 86 The power to authorize the participation of American personnel 
through § 344 is subject to the requirements that the participation enhance the 
military forces of the participating nation and that the personnel “improv[e the] 
interoperability” of the forces. 10 U.S.C.A. § 344. Neither of these restrictions 
seems to impose a problem for the action contemplated in this Note. 
 87 10 U.S.C.A. § 344 (emphasis added). 
 88 See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 6, at 1213 (stating that Congress can 
give the President “general advance authorization to make an agreement (or many 
agreements) that the President in his or her broad discretion can negotiate, 
conclude, and ratify without ever returning to Congress for its review, much less 
approval”). 
 89 Dames and Moore, 453 U.S. at 668 (citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 
U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
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separate from the signing of the agreement.90 Not until an agreement 
is ratified does it become fully binding on the ratifying nation.91 
Generally, the act of ratification is to deposit an “instrument of 
ratification” with a designated nation or international organization.92 
The act of ratification can only be accomplished by the President 
and, in the case of an agreement that has been authorized by an 
already existing statute, the President does not need to consult with 
Congress before undertaking an act of ratification.93 As a result, there 
should be no issues with the President’s ratifying any binding MOUs 
for the establishment of an ESCOE. 
iv. Presidential Power to Implement 
Once the MOUs for an ESCOE are completed, all that is left 
for the President to do is implement the MOUs and carry out the 
obligations. Though it may sometimes be a battle for the President to 
get Congress to agree to fund a specific project, that should not be 
the case for an ESCOE. There should be little problem with the 
President’s implementation here because of the authority conferred 
by Congress in § 344 as the statute expressly permits the use of funds 
appropriated to the Department of Defense for satisfying the United 
States’ NATO COE obligations.94 Furthermore, § 344 authorizes the 
use of Department of Defense “[f]acilities and equipment” to 
support NATO COEs.95 Through the broad authority conferred by 
§ 344, the President should be confident in his ability to satisfy the 
funding obligations of an ESCOE. Once the President has completed 
the above described steps, attention then turns to Congress’ ability to 
incorporate the lessons learned from an ESCOE into U.S. election 
law. 
 
 90 Curtis A. Bradley, Unratified Treaties, Domestic Politics, and the U.S. 
Constitution, 48 HARV. INT’L L.J. 307, 313 (2007). 
 91 Id. 
 92 Id. at 307. 
 93 See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 6, at 1213. 
 94 10 U.S.C.A. § 344. 
 95 Id. 
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C. Congressional Authority to Implement 
Article I, section 2 of the United States Constitution provides 
that “the electors in each state shall have the qualifications requisite 
for electors of the most numerous branch of the state legislature.”96 
This section has been interpreted as allowing the states to “define 
who [is] to vote for the popular branch of their own legislature, and 
the constitution of the United States says the same persons shall vote 
for members of congress in that state.”97 Article I, section 4 
supplements the statement in section 2 and explains that it is the 
power of each state to set the “times, places and manner” for electing 
members of the House of Representatives and Senators, “but the 
Congress may at any time by law make or alter such regulations, 
except as to the places of choosing Senators.”98 The United States 
Supreme Court has explained the impact of section 4 as granting 
authority for Congress “to provide a complete code for congressional 
elections, not only as to times and places, but in relation to notices, 
registration, supervision of voting, protection of voters, prevention 
of fraud and corrupt practices, counting of votes, duties of inspectors 
and canvassers, and making and publication of election returns.”99 
The effect of these two sections is that Congress has the 
power to preempt state regulations regarding an election that involves 
votes for federal offices. This includes a “mixed election,” an election 
where both state and federal positions are up for a vote, even when 
the Congressional regulation is violated without a clear intent to 
interfere with a vote for a federal office.100 
 
 96 U.S. Const. art. I, § 2. 
 97 The Ku Klux Cases, 110 U.S. 651, 663 (1884) (explaining Article I, section 
2 of the Constitution). 
 98 U.S. Const. art. I, § 4. 
 99 Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 366 (1932). 
 100 See Ex parte Coy, 127 U.S. 731, 754–55 (1888) (discussing that an 
individual can violate a law designed to protect a federal elections by merely 
interfering with the election process or procedure set out by law, even if the 
individual lacks an intent to influence the election with regard to a federal office); 
see also United States v. Bowman, 636 F.2d 1003, 1009-12 (5th Cir. 1981) (“[W]hen 
federal and state candidates are together on the same ballot, Congress may regulate 
any activity which exposes the federal aspects of the election to the possibility of 
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VI. MAKING IT HAPPEN: BUILDING FROM EXISTING LAWS 
The most effective way to operationalize the knowledge 
gained from the international community would be for Congress to 
act. Congress should exercise its authority to regulate federal 
elections and set election interference prevention requirements for all 
states. The broad authority granted to Congress under Article I, 
section 4 gives Congress the power to impose requirements on state 
election officials to provide information to the federal government 
about potential incidents of election interference and to mandate that 
states have voting systems in place that satisfy minimum, baseline 
requirements created by an ESCOE. Though the exact shape that 
this new legislation should take is beyond the scope of this Note, one 
could imagine new federal legislation growing from the foundation 
laid by 50 U.S.C. § 3371b and 52 U.S.C. § 21081. 
A requirement for states to provide information to the federal 
government about potential incidents of election interference could 
build on 50 U.S.C. § 3371b.101 Through § 3371b, the Department of 
Homeland Security is authorized to share “classified information 
related to threats to election systems and to the election process” 
with designated state government officials.102 To facilitate a flow of 
information from state governments to the federal government and 
an ESCOE, Congress should draft new legislation that compliments 
§ 3371b and flips the flow of information so that states are required 
to report any information related to threats to election systems and 
the election process to the Department of Homeland security. Many 
states likely already have processes in place to facilitate this flow of 
information but imposing such a requirement may prompt states to 
share the information quicker and allow more time for a meaningful 
response from the federal government. 
Congress could also enact legislation that provides an election 
systems baseline informed by ESCOE expertise. This baseline could 
 
corruption, whether or not the actual corruption takes place and whether or not the 
persons participating in such activity had a specific intent to expose the federal 
election to such corruption or possibility of corruption.”). 
 101 50 U.S.C.A. § 3371b (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-140). 
 102 Id. 
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be modeled on 52 U.S.C. § 21081,103 a statute enacted in 2002 
seemingly to avoid a repeat of the 2000 Presidential Election’s 
“hanging chad issue.”104 This section imposes a series of minimum 
requirements for election systems. Congress should either update 
§ 21081 to reflect the requirements for modern election systems or 
leave the section as it is and mirror its format in new legislation. This 
new election baseline statute would be the ideal way to put the 
knowledge of an ESCOE to use. 
Without Congress taking this final step to implement the 
lessons learned from an ESCOE, the United States might not reap 
the maximum possible benefits from its efforts to create an ESCOE. 
As the 2016 Presidential Election made clear, the United States has 
room to improve its election security, and without federal action 
there may be no action taken to correct this problem. The reality of 
having an election system that relies on federalism means that unless 
Congress steps and exercises its powers to preempt state policies, 
election security and infrastructure often relies heavily on small local 
governments.105 Without a guiding federal hand, it simply seems 
unrealistic to rely on a local county government to implement the 
international wisdom gained from an ESCOE. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The United States and its NATO allies have felt the 
disruption that can be caused by election interference, and it is time 
to take additional steps to prevent future interference by developing 
an ESCOE. The groundwork for this next step has been laid by the 
G7 RRM. The United States should take a prominent role in building 
on the G7 RRM’s groundwork by leading the creation of an Election 
Security Centre of Excellence (ESCOE) accredited by the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the President and 
 
 103 52 U.S.C.A. § 21081 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-140). 
 104 See Brian Kim, Help America Vote Act, 40 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 579, 591 
(2003) (discussing the Help America Vote Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 
Stat. 1666, 1666-1730, which included the provision now codified at 52 U.S.C. 
§ 21081). 
 105 Election Security, DEPT. OF HOMELAND SECURITY, 
https://www.dhs.gov/topic/election-security (last visited Apr. 26, 2020). 
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Congress should take the actions within their authority to weave the 
knowledge gained from an ESCOE into U.S. election laws. 
Once the President and Congress have completed their roles, 
it is important that the strategies and methods of protecting elections 
be distributed beyond the G7 nations for the democracies around the 
globe to be secure in their election results. Allowing this knowledge 
to be more widely shared will continue to raise the costs and efforts 
needed to interfere in elections, a necessary deterrent. With this 
deterrent in place, the United States and democracies around the 
world will be able to better ensure that they have a healthy election 
system and that the system has the confidence of the people 
necessary for sustaining democracy. 
 
